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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the trends in rotorcraft accident statistics, particularly regarding Loss of Control In-flight 
accidents (LOC-I), with the aim of stimulating interest in new research relevant to this area. Despite recent safety 
initiatives, LOC-I rotorcraft accidents have been identified as a significant and growing contribution to accident rates. 
The fixed-wing commercial airline community faced a similar situation starting in the late 1990s and, through a 
coordinated international effort, developed a new training program to help reduce accident rates. Lessons learned from 
the fixed-wing work are presented to highlight the need for improved rotorcraft modeling tools to reduce rotorcraft 
accidents through higher-quality, simulator-based training programs. The findings from previous and ongoing 
rotorcraft modeling and simulation research are presented, and areas for further research are identified. A proposal is 
made in the paper for a workshop to bring together the key rotorcraft stakeholders to develop future steps in tackling 
rotorcraft LOC-I accidents. 
 
NOTATION  
ASID  Additive System IDentification 
AG  Action Group 
CAST  Commercial Aviation Safety Team 
CS  Certification Specification 
EAP  Emergency and Abnormal Procedures 
EHSAT  European Helicopter Safety Analysis Team 
EHSEST European Helicopter Safety Team 
EPAS  European Plan for Aviation Safety 
FFS  Full Flight Simulator 
FNPT Flight and Navigational Procedures               Trainer 
FSG  Flight Simulation Group 
FSTD  Flight Simulation Training Device 
FTD  Flight Training Device 
HQ  Handling Qualities 
H-SE  Helicopter Safety Enhancement 
ICATEE  International Committee for Aviation Training in Extended Envelopes 
IHST  International Helicopter Safety Team 
IR  Intervention Recommendations 
LOC  Loss of Control (including ground events) 
LOC-I  Loss of Control In-flight 
LTRE  Loss of Tail Rotor Effectiveness 
MCC  Multi-Crew Cooperation 
NTSB  National Transportation Safety Board 
OEI  One Engine Inoperative 
OMCT  Objective Motion Cueing Test 
SD  Spatial Disorientation 
SID  System IDentification 
SME  Subject Matter Expert 
SPS  Standard Problem Sets 
SWR  Stepwise Regression 
UPRT  Upset Prevention and Recovery Training 
USHST  US Helicopter Safety Team 
USJHSAT US Joint Helicopter Safety Analysis Team 
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INTRODUCTION1 
The safety of rotorcraft operations has been a major area of concern for the past few decades. Several initiatives have been 
introduced to reduce accident numbers and rates through improved designs, operational procedures, training and reinforcement 
of a safety culture in operators. In his 2006 Alexander Nikolsky Lecture, “No Accidents – That’s the Objective” (Ref. 1), 
Franklin Harris cited his analysis of over 10,000 accidents statistics in the period 1964 – 2005, (derived from his previous 
NASA report (Ref. 2)), identifying a number of concerning trends. As shown in Figure 1, whilst there was a downward trend 
in the number of accidents per year over the period, the roughly linear trend suggested that, at the current rate it will be 2060 
before the numerator of any accident statistics would become “zero”. Within the data shown, several observed “spikes” were 
attributed to the introduction of new aircraft types into the fleet, which serves as a word of caution for the current drive to 
develop new eVTOL aircraft. Careful consideration of the design, handling qualities (HQs) and operation of new vehicles 
should be central to any new rotorcraft development. This need to improve vehicle design, producing vehicles with improved 
handling qualities to the point “where pilot errors, in any shape or form attributable to deficient flight characteristics, are 
things of the past” was a key message from Padfield’s 2012 Alexander Nikolsky lecture (Ref. 3). 
 
Figure 1. Hours flown and accidents per year (Ref. 2). 
In his analysis, Harris also drew attention to a range of HQs issues e.g. poor autorotational performance and the susceptibility 
of the loss of directional control in the current fleet. He identified an undesirable trend that Loss of Control In-flight (LOC-I) 
related accidents had doubled as a percentage in the period analyzed, as shown in Figure 2, accounting for 12% of commercial 
and 32% of general aviation accidents. Harris made several recommendations to improve rotorcraft safety including continuing 
to review the accidents statistics, encourage academia to be more involved with research to improve rotorcraft safety, and to 
“beg, borrow or steal a copy of NASA/TM-2000-209597” (Ref. 2) to better understand where gains in safety can be achieved. 
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Figure 2. Illustration of the increase of LOC accidents (Ref. 2). 
Following on from Harris’ work, the need to reduce accident rates was the focus of the International Helicopter Safety Team 
(IHST). Formed in 2005 to address factors affecting the “unacceptable” helicopter accident rate, the IHST’s mission was to 
facilitate an 80% reduction in accident rates by 2016. Its strategy for tackling accident rates was based on the data-driven 
approach used by the Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST) formed in 1997.  Figure 3 shows the change in the accident 
rates following the start of the IHST initiative. 
 
Figure 3. Accident rate trends following IHST initiative (Ref. 4). 
Whilst there has been a decrease in the total number of accidents during the IHST activities (over 20% achieved by 2016) this 
has not met the target that was set. The trend for the number of fatal accidents appears almost flat suggesting that a “zero-
accident” year might not occur until after 2040.   
To understand the main causal factors of accidents, the US Joint Helicopter Safety Analysis Team (USJHAT) completed a 
review of 523 U.S. helicopter accidents from 2006 to 2011. The review identified that loss of control (LOC) was the main 
factor in 217 (41%) of the accidents (Ref. 5) as shown in Figure 4. LOC occurrences, which include ground events, are defined 
when the pilot loses control due to improper handling of the aircraft e.g. due to poor performance management or improperly 
responding to an onboard emergency, rather than due to a structural or mechanically-initiated problem.  
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Figure 4. Top five occurrence categories in USJHAT study (Ref. 5). 
It is evident from these statistics that further work is required to reduce LOC accidents and improve safety. Lessons learned 
from other aviation safety initiatives could help with this process. For example, CAST’s work led to a reduction in the fatality 
risk for commercial aviation in the United States by 83% from 1998 to 2008, and the LOC-I problem was tackled through an 
international collaborative effort (International Committee for Aviation Training in Extended Envelopes (ICATEE)) to 
successfully address the problem.  
The aim of this paper is to examine the key success factors, and lessons learned, from the ICATEE activity, and to stimulate 
new research collaborations to reduce rotorcraft LOC-I accidents. The next section describes the ICATEE activity and how it 
led to the development of a new Upset Prevention and Recovery Training (UPRT) program. UPRT uses training simulators to 
support the total training requirement, to address fixed-wing LOC-I accident rates. A review of rotorcraft safety initiatives 
follows this, identifying where some of the rotorcraft modeling and simulation challenges exist. A review of current rotorcraft 
flight-model fidelity and motion fidelity research is then presented. The paper is drawn to a close with a discussion on future 
research challenges together with potential next steps for initiating a new rotorcraft safety activity and some concluding 
remarks.  
LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE FIXED-WING WORLD 
Lambregts et al. (Ref. 6) undertook a review of fixed-wing upset accidents over a 15-year period (1993 – 2007) using, in part, 
the annual commercial airline accident statistics report produced by Boeing (Ref. 7). At this time, an aircraft upset was defined 
as any event with: 
 Pitch exceeding +25/-10 degrees, 
 Bank angle exceeding ±45 degrees, or 
 Inappropriate airspeed  
Lambregts et al. challenged this definition, citing the Armavia Flight 967 accident at Sochi where the aircraft had a pitch 
attitude of only -5 degrees, well within the limits above, but due to the low altitude of the aircraft it was not in a “normal” 
condition. (ICATEE subsequently redefined an upset as an “unintended deviation from the desired flight path”). Ref. 6 also 
indicated that upset/LOC accidents are not problems confined to general aviation or military fighters, they also happened to 
transport airplanes in scheduled service. Furthermore, LOC-I accidents were reported as “not a problem of yesteryear” (see 
Figure 5). Their analysis of the statistics highlighted the need for research to solve the root causes of this problem; stall was 
subsequently identified as the main causal factor leading to LOC-I accidents (see Figure 6). Based on their analysis, the need 
for new regulations and training programs was identified to improve flight safety. This would require a coordinated approach 
to address prevention of such upsets and recovery from them. 
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Figure 5. Aviation occurrence categories 2008 – 2017 (Ref. 7). 
 
 
Figure 6. Numbers of LOC-I incidents and contributing factors. 
The need to develop new training requirements was also identified in the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) report 
on the 2009 Colgan Air accident. The report indicated that the probable cause of the accident was the captain's inappropriate 
response to the activation of the stick shaker. This led to an aerodynamic stall and a loss of control on approach from which 
the airplane did not recover (Ref. 8). Published in 2010, the NTSB report contained several recommendations including the 
need to: “Define and codify minimum simulator model fidelity requirements to support an expanded set of stall recovery 
training requirements, including recovery from stalls that are fully developed. These simulator fidelity requirements should 
address areas such as required angle-of-attack and sideslip angle ranges, motion cueing (authors’ emphasis added), proof-of-
match with post-stall flight test data, and warnings to indicate when the simulator flight envelope has been exceeded”. 
The need to address LOC-I accidents for fixed-wing aircraft was a central theme for the Royal Aeronautical Society’s Flight 
Simulation Group (FSG) 2009 Spring Conference entitled: ‘Flight Simulation: Towards the Edge of the Envelope’ (Ref. 9); 
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this initiative was also cited in the NTSB Colgan Air accident report. UPRT was proposed as a major potential contributor to 
enhancing aviation safety, primarily since it would introduce measures to prevent upsets. The loss of Air France 447 coincided 
with the start of the conference, a sobering reminder of the importance of the work to come. ICATEE was formed during the 
FSG Conference to deliver a long-term strategy for reducing the rate of LOC-I accidents and incidents through enhanced UPRT 
(Ref. 10). A key factor in the success of the work was that the committee consisted of more than 80 members drawn from 
manufacturers, airlines, national aviation authorities and safety boards, simulator manufacturers, training providers, research 
institutions, academia and pilot representatives. 
ICATEE analyzed the causes of LOC-I and created two work streams. The Training and Regulations Stream addressed the 
development of a UPRT requirements matrix, and the Research and Technology Stream performed a thorough analysis of the 
technological requirements for UPRT (Ref. 11). The Technology stream reported that enhanced flight dynamics models 
representing post-stall behavior and icing effects were lacking. Key recommendations from the ICATEE work were as follows: 
• It required an integrated approach across the fixed-wing community including manufacturers, airlines, national aviation 
authorities and safety boards, simulator manufacturers, training providers, research institutions and pilot representatives, 
• For awareness and recognition (i.e. “prevention” training), current simulators without modification could be utilized if 
used in a more meaningful and proper manner, 
• Type-representative models are suitable for the recovery training from stalls. Models do not need to be exact per aircraft 
type, but need to support the training objectives, 
• Academics: the development and maintenance of applicable knowledge, complementing simulator training, to improve 
the pilots’ awareness of the fundamentals of aerodynamics, stall, cockpit indications, and human factors, 
• Enhancements require validation by Subject Matter Expert (SME) pilots, who must be properly qualified to assess the 
enhancements, 
• Enhancing the training benefits that can be derived from a range of training media.  
Above all, international standards and civil aviation regulations would have to be adjusted to accommodate the new UPRT 
requirements (training, licensing and Flight Simulation Training Devices (FSTDs)). 
The impact of the ICATEE work is that their recommendations resulted in a new ICAO Document 10011, “Manual on 
Aeroplane Upset Prevention and Recovery Training” (Ref. 12). National Aviation Authority regulations have also been 
impacted, with EASA UPRT requirements expected to be mandatory by December 2019 and the FAA requiring all Part 121 
airline pilots to be UPRT-trained by March 2020. LOC-I prevention and UPRT feature strongly in the European Plan for 
Aviation Safety (EPAS) (Ref. 13), with several Rule Making Tasks identified to improve safety by engaging key stakeholders 
e.g. pilots, instructors, examiners, Airline Training Organizations and operators. To ensure that the fixed-wing simulator 
qualification process keeps in line with the new training programs, specifically related to UPRT, it has been acknowledged that 
updates to the simulator standards are required (Ref. 14), reflecting the need for a more dynamic and data-driven approach to 
standards development. 
In terms of applying the lessons learned from the ICATEE work to future rotary wing LOC-I safety activities, there are a range 
of transferable items that would benefit any future initiatives. Adopting the approach suggested by Harris and ICATEE to 
conduct a thorough review of causal factors, related to both accidents and current training practices and needs, would be an 
important first step to define future work activities. LOC-I contributing factors maybe similar in both domains e.g. distraction 
or ineffective pilot monitoring. This could be addressed by developing skills for improved recognition and awareness of these 
events, especially when working as part of a crew. UPRT aids pilots in developing a mental model of how they, and the aircraft, 
are oriented in space; adopting this approach would also benefit rotary-wing pilots. Training exercises are learnt by rote and 
hence pilots have an expectation of what is to occur during the session. Exposing them to a different scenario so that they can 
experience the “startle” factor could aid them in managing stressful events in the future. ICATEE required a coordinated effort, 
not just in terms of stakeholders, but also in the media used to deliver the training.  
One of the most significant ICATEE findings was that pilots often do not understand the concepts of angle of attack or energy 
management. A “fix” to this problem was to use flight simulators as a teaching tool rather than a testing device or a systems 
trainer. The ICATEE team determined that 56% of the new training program could be developed with existing Level D 
simulators combined with academic lessons (Ref. 11). To achieve further benefit from the use of simulators would require 
flight-model enhancements to better represent the missing physics e.g. post-stall behavior. A similar approach could be adopted 
for rotary wing applications, namely identify the main causal factors and conduct a task analysis to identify gaps in current 
flight models that need to be addressed. 
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Another addition to FSTDs that supports UPRT is the ability for the instructor to receive real-time feedback on the validity of 
the flight model. During some maneuvers, the pilot may tend to bring the simulator to the edge of the validated flight envelope. 
Clearly, this should be reflected to the instructor in order to ensure that the FSTD response accurately reflects reality. 
ROTARY WING SAFETY INITIATIVES  
One aim of this paper is to stimulate new collaborative research that could inform new regulatory activities to reduce the number 
of rotorcraft LOC-I accidents. Hence, existing safety-related research initiatives need to be acknowledged. As stated previously, 
setting the IHST goal to reduce the worldwide helicopter accident rate by 80% in the decade to 2016 has led to a reduction in 
accident rates from 4.61 to 3.49 per 100,000 hours. It has also catalyzed further analysis of the causes of rotorcraft accidents, 
identifying that LOC-I was a factor in 41% of the accidents analyzed.  
The portrait of a typical LOC-I accident is given in Ref. 15. A Bell 206L-1 Long Ranger was being used to carry out a medivac 
operation at night in instrument meteorological conditions. The last minute of data depicted a turn to the left, a turn to the right, 
a reversal to the left, a reversal back to the right, and then a final reversal to the left (Figure 7). The NTSB report states the 
“…probable cause(s) of this accident [may be] the pilot’s loss of aircraft control, due to spatial disorientation, resulting in the 
in-flight separation of the main rotor and tail boom.” 
 
Figure 7. Final maneuvers prior to accident (Ref. 15). 
The USJHAT proposed a range of intervention recommendations (IRs) (see Figure 8) to reduce accident rates (Ref. 16) 
including the following training (T) related IRs: 
 T1060 - Simulator Training – Basic Maneuvers, Develop and implement a standard for pilot training focusing on 
operational-specific scenarios, human factors, and the use of simulators and flight training devices (FTDs)  
 T2060 - Simulator Training – Advanced Maneuvers. Incorporate simulators into training programs that would include 
dynamic rollover, emergency procedures training, ground resonance, quick stop maneuvers, targeting approach 
procedures and practice in approaches to pinnacle, unimproved landing areas, and elevated platforms  
 T6019 - Training emphasis for maintaining awareness of cues critical to safe flight. Establish training programs that train 
and evaluate proficiency of critical issues such as systems failures, impending weather concerns, effects of density 
altitude, and wind and surface conditions that can become critical to safe flight. 
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Figure 8. Top IRs from the USJHAT (Ref. 16). 
(Note: Percentages are not to sum to 100% as each accident was assigned multiple intervention recommendations) 
In 2016, the US Helicopter Safety Team (USHST, formed in 2013 as a regional partner with IHST) adopted a goal of achieving 
a 20% reduction in the US fatal helicopter accident rate by 2020. They undertook an analysis of 104 fatal helicopter accidents 
(2009–2013) to help identify the main common occurrence categories (Ref. 17). Using the CAST/ICAO Common Taxonomy 
Team (CICTT) occurrence categories, the three main categories contributing to half of the fatal accidents in that period were: 
LOC-I defined as loss of aircraft control or deviation from intended flightpath while in-flight, Unintended Flight in Instrument 
Meteorological Conditions and Low-Altitude Operations (Figure 9).  
 
Figure 9. Pareto chart of U.S. civil helicopter fatal accident data (2009-2013) (Ref. 17). 
This analysis of the accidents led to the identification of intervention strategies that could be implemented through Helicopter 
Safety Enhancement (H-SE) activities to tackle the underlying causal factors. Each H-SE identifies the organizations or groups 
who will implement the activity, a statement of the work required (informed by details of relevant accidents) and expected 
outputs; two simulator related activities are presented as follows. 
H-SE 81, “Improve Simulator Modeling for Outside-the-Envelope Flight Conditions” was established to “improve the accuracy 
of full flight simulators (FFS)/flight training devices by providing recommendations for developing better mathematical 
physics-based models (authors’ emphasis added) for helicopter flight dynamics”. The goal is to “achieve more realistic, higher-
fidelity simulations of outside-the-envelope flight conditions” and to examine the “possible use of simulation for purposes of 
preventing, recognizing, and recovering from spatial disorientation”. H-SE 127A, “Training for Recognition Recovery of 
Spatial Disorientation” aims to “develop training for recognition of spatial disorientation (SD) and recovery to controlled 
flight.” It is acknowledged in this H-SE that the helicopter community should promote the wider use of available SD simulation 
technology and training scenarios to create further awareness of impairment from SD and how to recover from such an event. 
The need for the wider use of flight simulators to help pilots prepare for emergencies and improve safety is also acknowledged 
by the NTSB, in their 2015 Safety Announcement, “Safety Through Helicopter Simulators” (Ref. 18) where they note, “it is 
difficult to recreate the element of surprise and the realistic, complex scenarios that pilots may experience during an 
emergency. Without simulators, viable lesson components may be limited”; a theme also identified in the ICATEE work. The 
challenge here is to develop simulators and scenarios to help with this training. What are not included in this document are the 
simulation fidelity requirements to conduct such training. 
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In Europe, similar analyses of accident statistics have been undertaken (Ref. 19). The European Helicopter Safety Analysis 
Team (EHSAT), a sub-group of the European Helicopter Safety Team (EHEST) conducted reviews of two sets of accident 
data, 2000-2005 and 2006-2010. In this latter period some national teams were not able to analyze their results so only 30% of 
the 527 accidents that occurred were included in the analysis. The output of their data analysis was not presented in the same 
manner as the USHST’s work making direct comparisons of the main accident causal factors difficult. Figure 10 shows the 
standard problem statements (SPS) Level 1 (IHST taxonomy of the 14 main factors contributing to an accident) that were 
identified in the two periods. Pilot judgment featured in almost 70% of all accidents analyzed and situation awareness in more 
than 33% of accidents; there were only small reductions in both in the 10-year period analyzed.  
 
Figure 10. Percentage of analyzed accidents where SPS Level 1 was assigned at least once (Ref. 19). 
The report does identify various IRs to address these problems (see Figure 11) and the results were aimed at informing the 
content of the rotorcraft section of the European Plan for Aviation Safety (EPAS) (Ref. 13). A training/instructional IR was 
identified as one of the leading IRs, although how to conduct this is not described and the need for new research was not 
identified as a key IR.  
 
 
Figure 11. Number of IRs Level 1 – all accidents 2000-2010 (Ref. 19). 
As part of the instructional IRs, EHEST has produced a variety of material to raise awareness of safety issues in the rotorcraft 
community. Reference 20, (“Training and Testing of Emergency and Abnormal Procedures in Helicopters”) shows that a 
significant number of helicopter accidents occur during the training or testing of emergency and abnormal procedures (EAP). 
The leaflet aims to provide guidance to instructors and examiners to safely deliver EAP in flight. For Upset/Unusual Attitude 
Training, it is recommended that it should be conducted in good visual meteorological conditions with the candidate’s visibility 
limited by screens or goggles. This type of training, according to one former instructor (Ref. 21), has hardly changed in 30 
years and it is not clear how more of the same training will address the LOC-I issue highlighted earlier. In the fixed-wing UPRT 
development, the introduction of “failures” that enhance pilot situation awareness and teach better orientation was highlighted 
as an area for improvement. These may not necessarily be failures in the aircraft systems, but instead “blanking out” certain 
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portions of the outside world and/or instrument displays to query the pilot on their situation at that time. While these are not 
usually included in FSTDs, the fixed wing community has found them to be helpful during UPRT and SD training. 
It should be noted here that the EPAS document identifies addressing offshore helicopter LOC-I accidents as a strategic priority. 
However no new research initiatives have been identified to help reduce offshore accidents. Furthermore, in the EASA research 
agenda, section 2.4 “Rotorcraft”, (Ref. 22), there are no initiatives relating to LOC-I to aid in the reduction of accident rates. 
The research agenda does highlight the need to think “out of the box” to look at how training with new device platforms e.g. 
virtual reality, could be used to provide innovation for FSTD qualification, but it does not deal with specific training needs. 
Rotorcraft flight simulators in Europe are qualified through CS-FSDT(H) (Ref. 23) which includes the technical 
minimum requirements/standards for each level of qualification (or type).  Within CS-FSTD(H), the following qualification 
level types are identified: 
 Flight and Navigational Procedures Trainer I, II, III (FNPT)  
 Flight Training Device 1, 2, 3 (FTD)  
 Full Flight Simulator A, B, C, D (FFS) 
Table 1 indicates the training value and credits that can be derived using the different kinds of flight simulator as part of an 
approved training program (Ref. 24). The main market for this training is the commercial aviation sector. Reference 24 states 
that to comply with Private Pilot Licensing requirements, trainees should have completed at least 45 hours of flight instruction, 
five of which can be completed in FSTDs. It also notes, given that safety analyses point to General Aviation (GA) being a 
significant contributor to the high number of accidents, FSTDs should be more widely used for PPL(H) training; echoing the 
USHST’s recommendations. 
What is absent in these rotorcraft safety initiatives is a clear, coordinated strategy of how to use modeling and simulation to 
support training that reduces accidents, and the supporting research required to achieve this. As the increased use of simulators 
has been identified as an important part of a strategy to improve safety, questions arise regarding what level of fidelity is 
required to achieve a positive transfer of training and how might this be assessed? Central to the utility of a simulator for 
delivering effective training is confidence in the fidelity standards against which it has been qualified. Uncertainties in the 
validity of metrics contained in the standards could undermine the benefits of training devices. A review of previous modeling 
and simulation research follows in the next section to identify where new contributions could be made to enhance existing 
standards.  
Table 1. Rotorcraft Simulation Training. 
Simulator 
Type 
Training Value Training 
Credits 
FNPT Ab-Initio 
Procedures Training 
Instrument Training 
Navigation 
Safety Exercises 
Multi-Crew 
Cooperation (MCC) 
Up to 30% ab-
initio flight 
hours (ATPL 
integrated) 
FTD Type Rating 
Procedures 
Recurrent Training 
Ab-Initio 
Safety Exercises 
MCC 
Up to 67% 
type rating 
hours 
Up to 33% ab-
initio flight 
hours 
FFS Type Rating 
Recurrent Training 
Navigation 
Safety Exercises 
MCC 
Up to 83% 
type rating 
flight hours 
Up to 36% ab-
initio flight 
hours 
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ROTARY WING MODELLING AND SIMULATION RESEARCH  
As previously mentioned, CS-FSTD(H) defines the criteria that need to be satisfied to allow the qualification of a simulator. 
From a safety perspective, the criteria contained within it should be robust and unambiguous. Several studies have been 
conducted to examine the validity of the CS-STD(H) tolerances and criteria; an overview of this research is provided here. 
GARTEUR Action Group (AG) HC-AG12 was formed to conduct a critical examination of the then existing simulator standard, 
JAR-STD 1H (Ref. 25), (replaced by EASA CS-FSTD(H) in 2012), including correlation of handling qualities metrics and 
fidelity metrics (Refs. 26-28). The work revealed a range of shortcomings and opportunities to enhance the standards with new 
metrics. For example, the AG showed that the relationship between fidelity and the JAR-STD 1H tolerances is sensitive to the 
nature of the maneuver being flown and, more significantly, that matching tolerances does not always lead to matching handling 
qualities. AG12 also identified the need to bridge the gap between subjective opinion and formal metrics and the importance 
of developing an objective means for assessing overall fidelity. 
In the previous section, using flight simulators to train for emergency situations was highlighted as an important approach for 
improving safety. In AG12, such a case was considered - One Engine Inoperative (OEI) landings, and the suitability of the CS 
tolerances were examined. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations (Ref. 29) for emergencies required that, for 
Category-A certification (multi-engine helicopters), helicopters should be able to continue their flight with OEI. In the case of 
an engine failure occurring after the helicopter has passed the landing decision point the pilot must continue the landing. The 
CS simulation tolerances for this case are given in Table 2. 
Table 2. CS-FSTD(H) OEI Tolerances. 
Parameter Tolerance 
Airspeed ± 3kts 
Altitude ± 20ft 
Rotor speed ±1.5% 
Pitch attitude ±1.5% 
Torque ± 3% 
Bank attitude ± 1.5deg 
Heading ± 2deg 
Longitudinal control position ± 10% 
Lateral control position ± 10% 
Directional control position ± 10% 
Collective control position ± 10% 
 
A four degree-of-freedom helicopter model (including horizontal body-velocity, rate of descent, pitch rate and the rotor 
rotational speed) was used to examine three test cases: reference case (where no tolerances were applied), upper limit (using 
the “+” tolerances in Table 2), lower limit (using the “–” tolerances in Table 2); the resulting trajectories are shown in Figure 
12. A safe landing region was defined where the touchdown was within acceptable velocity limits, namely vertical velocity (w) 
less than 1.5m/sec and horizontal velocity (u) less than 4.5m/sec. 
The allowable tolerance ranges produce a landing scatter of +200/-90m from the reference case and moves the landing velocities 
outside of the safe region. From a safety point of view, this variation could lead to negative transfer of training giving the 
trainee an incorrect understanding of the performance of the helicopter in an emergency. 
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Figure 12. Helicopter landing footprint with simulation tolerances limits (Ref. 28). 
Research has been conducted at the University of Liverpool (UoL) addressing the AG12 recommendations to develop a method 
for the subjective assessment of simulator fidelity and the formulation of new objective metrics. The simulator fidelity rating 
(SFR) scale (see Appendix 1) was developed in the Lifting Standards (LS1) project at UoL to provide a method for an evaluating 
pilot to directly rate the suitability of the overall simulation for a specified task (Ref. 30). The pilot is asked to compare the 
level of performance attained in flight and simulator, and to judge the level of ‘adaptation’ of task control strategy that was 
used in flight compared with simulation. New objective fidelity metrics (Ref. 31) were also developed in the LS1 project, based 
on ADS-33E-PRF HQ metrics (Ref. 32).  
The methodologies developed in LS1 were used to investigate an objective criterion that is ill-defined in CS-FSTD(H), related 
to a flight-model’s off-axis response (Ref. 33). CS-FSTD(H) states that, following a longitudinal input, the on-axis response of 
the simulation data should be within either ±10% of the achieved peak in the flight data, or ±3 deg/sec, whichever is less 
restrictive and the off-axis model response should be of “correct trend and magnitude” (CT&M) when compared to flight data. 
Figure 13 shows the on- and off-axis responses of a FLIGHTLAB Bell 412 (F-B412) simulation model (configured with a 
Rate-Command-Attitude-Hold (RCAH) system) following a 0.5-inch longitudinal input. Additional roll/pitch cross couplings 
were implemented in FLIGHTLAB by directing a proportion (20%, 50% and 100%) of the longitudinal control input into the 
roll axis. The off-axis responses exhibit the correct trend and so questions arise as to whether the magnitudes are “correct” and 
what effect the difference would have on a pilot’s experience of the simulation? 
 
Figure 13. On and off-axis rate responses to a longitudinal cyclic input for cross coupling variations (Ref. 33). 
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One way to assess the effect of the additional cross-couplings is to use the inter-axis coupling criteria in ADS-33E-PRF (Ref. 
32). This is defined, in this case, as the ratio of peak off-axis roll attitude response (pk) from trim, within 4 seconds, to the 
on-axis pitch attitude response from trim at 4 seconds, (4), following a longitudinal control step input. As additional cross-
coupling is increased in the model the HQs degrade from Level 1 for the baseline (no addition cross-coupling) to Level 3, 
suggesting the fidelity of the model has been compromised (see Figure 14). 
 
Figure 14. ADS-33E-PRF roll/pitch coupling requirements for aggressive agility (Ref. 33). 
This was assessed subjectively using the SFR scale for an ADS-33E-PRF accel-decel maneuver. Pilots trained in the baseline 
configuration and then, following a model change, awarded an SFR based on their comparison with the baseline. The results 
in Figure 15 show that, as the cross-coupling increases, the SFRs awarded degrade from Level 1 to Level 3. This is indicative 
of a significant change in performance and considerable adaptation of task strategy (see Appendix 1). An additional cross-
coupling value of 20% produced a mean SFR that was on the Level 1-2 SFR boundary indicating that, based on their subjective 
opinion, this would represent the boundary of an acceptable level of CT&M. Whilst these results are not comprehensive, they 
do show that a combination of new objective metrics and subjective assessments can be used to investigate revisions to the CS 
standards. 
 
Figure 15. SFRs awarded for cross coupling tests. 
To satisfy the proof-of-match tolerances for a Level D flight simulator, modifying or tuning the parameters of the flight 
simulation model using either a physical or non-physical process is permitted. System IDentification (SID) (Ref. 34) has been 
applied as an effective approach for informing this tuning process. A non-physical tuning approach has been developed by 
CAE (Ref. 35) which uses SID techniques to optimize simulation parameters which may not be known e.g. flap-hinge stiffness, 
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to meet the flight simulator standards proof-of-match requirements. This approach satisfies the Level D requirements but does 
not necessarily capture any missing physics which may be important in LOC-I simulations. 
In the LS1 project, SID was used to explore the fidelity of existing rotorcraft simulation models and to produce a rational, 
physics-based approach to simulation fidelity improvement through model renovation (Ref. 36). The renovation process 
involves augmenting the nonlinear flight-model based on differences in identified (stability and control) derivatives. Figure 16 
illustrates the fidelity improvement of the renovated nonlinear FLIGHTLAB Bell412 model in the roll, pitch and yaw axes. 
Identification and renovation of non-physical modeling parameters in the simulation models are key to improving model 
fidelity, especially in dynamic maneuvers. 
 
Figure 16. Comparison of responses from lateral cyclic input with the renovated nonlinear F-B412 (Ref. 36). 
The above renovation method is to some extent limited due to the procedure relying on linear information extracted from the 
SID approach and the tuning process for repairing the deficiencies associated with the fidelity of a model. These limitations 
can put constraints on its application especially where nonlinearities and hereditary effects can influence the model’s response, 
such as in edge-of-the-envelope and out-of-the-envelope flight regimes, where current flight-models are inaccurate. These 
deficiencies may lead to unrealistic training of maneuvers such as loss of tail rotor effectiveness (LTRE), vortex ring 
state/settling with power, and autorotation; topics noted for further research in the H-SE activities. The NTSB investigated 55 
accidents involving LTRE during the 10-year period from 2004 to 2014. The results revealed that the pilots were unable to 
recover when the helicopters encountered unanticipated yaw suffered from the LTRE. Improved pilot training can help to 
reduce these accidents and improved simulator fidelity enables an increase in simulator/flight ratio in training.  
At UoL, the Rotorcraft Simulation Fidelity (RSF) (Ref. 37) project has proposed a new identification approach in the time-
domain, Additive System-IDentification (ASID), to address the nonlinearities associated with complex maneuvers. This is 
described in more detail in our companion paper at the VFS 75th forum (Ref. 38). In the ASID approach the model parameters 
are identified sequentially based on their contribution to the local dynamic response of the system, i.e. over a defined time 
range. One or more candidate parameters in a proposed model structure are identified using the primary response characteristic 
of the rotorcraft; others are then identified in a sequential manner.  
The results in Figure 17 illustrate the effectiveness of the ASID approach, comparing with the linear perturbation (Pert.) method 
and the conventional StepWise Regression (SWR) approach in the time domain (Ref. 39). ASID and SWR were applied on the 
6 degree of freedom roll dynamics, using an equation-error process. The roll acceleration p  curves of ASID and SWR in Figure 
17 were constructed using the identified derivative values (e.g. rolling moment due to roll rate, Lp) derived from the 
corresponding flight test data (e.g. roll rate p), respectively.  
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Figure 17. Comparison of fit across three approaches: Perturbation, SWR and ASID. 
Figure 17 shows the best fit with flight test data is achieved by the ASID method. SWR shows a poorer fit between 0.5 and 
3sec, mainly due to the poorly identified derivatives (e.g. rolling moment due to pitch rate, Lq). The fit with linear perturbation 
derivatives from the F-B412 diverges after 1.5sec, mainly due to Lq being significantly different from flight test. These results 
demonstrate the effectiveness of ASID to derive derivative values that result an improved fit. The RSF research is applying 
ASID to more complex maneuvers. Combining the results from different maneuvers in a new renovation process offers the 
potential for capturing a fuller range of physical effects that may be important, but only weakly present in simpler maneuvers. 
MOTION CUEING RESEARCH  
In 1910, Flight magazine (Ref. 40) reported, “Even the most apt pupil is certain to find himself in difficulties at some time or 
another during his probation… The Invention therefore of a device which will enable the novice to obtain a clear conception 
of the workings of an aeroplane and conditions existent in the air without any risk personally or otherwise is to be welcomed 
without doubt. Several have already been constructed to this end, and the Sanders Teacher is the latest to enter the field.” The 
Sanders “Teacher” (Figure 18) featured aircraft parts (a ‘first’ in simulators) and a turn-table and rocker system that allowed 
the trainee to experience the effect of wind in the simulator; a first step in motion cueing and the topic of “motion cueing” (and 
by this we are considering vestibular motion cueing), and its benefit in simulator-based training is still being debated.  
 
Figure 18. Sanders Teacher. 
One of challenges in this debate is the lack of supporting evidence in the simulator standards regarding the benefit of motion 
cueing. Burki-Cohen et al. (Ref. 41) noted, “The existing standards for flight simulation qualification, all of which entail a 
requirement for platform motion cueing, have a twenty-year record of meeting the requisite requirement for transfer of 
performance. In the absence of competing evidence to the contrary, it is therefore prudent to maintain these standards in the 
interest of public safety”. In a subsequent paper, Longridge et al. (Ref. 42) reported that in fixed-wing simulators motion 
improved the acceptability of the simulator, pilot performance and control behavior in the simulator, but found no evidence of 
the benefits of motion in transferring to the aircraft. McCauley (Ref. 43), investigated the need for motion bases in army 
helicopter simulators and found that, whilst flight simulators were identified as “unquestionably valuable for training safely”, 
no evidence to support effectiveness of motion platforms for training was found. 
When examining the current standards, there is no clear guidance on when motion is required for a given training task. As 
shown in Table 3 and there are no fidelity tolerances provided for the roll, pitch or sway motion envelopes provided. There are 
different motion requirements for the FSTD levels shown (e.g. A/B and C/D) but no rationale is provided for the validity of 
these criteria. For the ‘lower’ level FTD devices, there is no requirement for motion.  
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Table 3. CS-FSTD(H) Motion Requirements (Ref. 23). 
 
Motion fidelity criteria have been proposed by Sinacori (Ref. 44) based on measures of the gain and phase shift between the 
flight-model output and the motion system commands at a frequency of 1rad/s. The criteria were developed from investigations 
of an ‘S’-turn maneuver along a runway at 60kts with a six-degree-of-freedom model of a high-performance helicopter. Figure 
19 shows Sinacori’s translational fidelity criteria and the three-point fidelity rating scale used to elicit pilot opinion on the 
fidelity of the motion cues. It should be noted that Sinacori stated these criteria “have little or no support other than intuition”. 
 
Figure 19. Sinacori’s translational fidelity criteria (Ref. 44). 
Despite this statement, Sinacori’s criteria have been as the basis for motion fidelity testing. Hodge et al. (Ref. 45) reviewed 
research undertaken for roll-sway motion tuning. Figure 20 shows the results from this review.  The different gains and break 
frequencies used in the studies are shown in parenthesis, suggesting that high fidelity motion can be achieved, based on 
Sinacori’s criteria, through selective tuning of the motion filter parameters. 
Hodge et al. (Ref. 46) used a short-stroke hexapod simulator (Ref. 47) to investigate optimizing the cues with third-order filters 
in the roll and sway axes (A1 to A6 in Figure 20 indicate the configurations tested in Ref. 46). A 10-point motion fidelity rating 
TESTS TOLERANCE FSTD Level 
  FFS FTD 
  A B C D 1 2 3 
4. MOTION SYSTEM         
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± 25º 
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 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
High  Motion sensations are close to those of visual flight 
Medium  Motion sensation differences are noticable but not objectionable 
Low  Differences are noticable and objectionable, loss of performance, disorientation 
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scale was devised to elicit pilot opinion, since the participating test pilots considered the previous three-point scale to be too 
coarse to distinguish the subtle differences in motion cues (Ref. 48). Pilots judged that good motion cues could be obtained in 
a small motion platform by careful selection of the roll and sway-axis motion gains (KKy) and that roll-axis break frequency 
(hp) had a dominant effect on motion fidelity (see Figure 21).  
 
Figure 20. Sinacori’s rotational fidelity criteria. 
 
Figure 21. Effect of roll motion gain and break frequency on motion fidelity. 
Whilst there have been several studies examining the effect of motion on single or limited axis tasks, there is still the need to 
examine the motion requirements for multi-axis tasks, considering aircraft with different levels of handling qualities undergoing 
a range of different dynamic maneuvers. Manso et al. (Ref. 49) conducted simulator experiments that examined the effect of 
motion cueing on task performance and workload for a range of test maneuvers. Three test pilots flew three rotorcraft response 
types - Attitude Command Attitude Hold (ACAH), Rate Command Attitude Hold (RCAH) and bare airframe; covering a range 
of handling qualities. The ADS-33E-PRF test maneuvers (bob-up, pirouette, precision hover, lateral reposition and accel/decel) 
were flown with different levels of task aggressiveness. A comparison was made for each maneuver between testing with no 
motion and a motion case, with a subjectively tuned set of motion drive laws. For the precision hover task, the results indicate 
that, as the HQs degrade, there is a larger difference in the HQ ratings (HQRs) awarded for the no-motion versus motion cases 
(Figure 22, Ref. 49).  
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Figure 22. HQR (upper) and SFR (lower) results for the Precision Hover task. 
The SFR scale was used to compare motion to no-motion cases with the pilots “training” in the motion case and then assessing 
the effect of no-motion on the test maneuver. The pilots awarded poorer average SFRs as the HQs degraded and comments 
from the pilots indicated that they were lacking feedback from the motion platform which led to a degradation in task 
performance and considerable task strategy adaptation. The results suggest that simulator motion fidelity requirements are not 
only task-based but are also dependent on the handling qualities of the aircraft being flown. 
An attempt to change the focus of simulator standards to be more training-led has been made in the development of ICAO 9625 
(Ref. 50). ICAO 9625 establishes the simulation fidelity levels required to support the range of training tasks carried out for 
different pilot licenses and ratings. It recognizes the need for training specific features and fidelity requirements.  Each 
simulation feature e.g. cockpit layout, flight model has a required level of fidelity e.g. generic, representative and specific or 
none, if the feature is not required, for a given training task. Whilst it does not provide any new fidelity tolerances, Reference 
50 does include details of an objective motion cueing test (OMCT), which measures the performance of the complete motion 
system, including the motion drive algorithm (Ref. 51). In Ref. 51 it was noted that OMCT was developed from the assessment 
of fixed-wing simulators and further work is required to examine requirements for rotorcraft. This need was confirmed by Jones 
et al. (Ref. 52) who examined the suitability of OMCT criteria for a rotorcraft pirouette, lateral reposition and a pursuit tracking 
task. The subjective motion fidelity ratings awarded by the pilot for the tasks investigated were not in agreement with the fixed-
wing boundaries. The work identified the need for further research to define rotorcraft specific OMCT boundaries.  A similar 
recommendation was made by Dalmeijer et al. (Ref. 53) who noted that whilst the OMCT requirements for heave motion were 
satisfactory for rotorcraft, further research was required to define rotorcraft specific boundaries.  
A challenge in trying to discern the utility of motion cueing in flight simulators from the published literature is that results are 
presented for different simulators, with different capabilities, simulating different tasks whilst using different flight models. As 
noted by Grant (Ref. 54), experiments are rarely repeated before trying to extend the work using new methods. Hence if the 
new study contradicts any previous work it may not be clear if this is due to a different simulator or test protocol being used. It 
is anticipated that understanding the possible contributions of vestibular motion cueing to the simulation of LOC-I will require 
a more coordinated approach to help inform future simulator and regulatory requirements. 
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DISCUSSION AND NEXT STEPS 
An examination of rotorcraft accident statistics has shown that, despite the excellent work undertaken internationally to reduce 
the accident rate, it is likely to be some time before the safety targets are met.  Furthermore, whilst the overall accident rate 
trend is downwards, LOC-I accidents, one of the main contributing factors to the rates, are increasing. When faced with an 
unacceptable LOC-I accident rate in the fixed-wing community, a coordinated effort between all stakeholders was required to 
develop the UPRT program to tackle this problem. Some elements of UPRT can be transferred to rotorcraft training such as 
including startle in scenarios, education to develop skills for better awareness and recognition and, most importantly, more 
effective use of flight simulators to support the overall training needs.  
To improve flight-models for use in LOC-I training, an assessment of current CS standards should be undertaken to identify 
where new fidelity criteria/tolerances are required. Several initiatives related to this have been launched but this should be 
extended to the wider international community as was the case with ICATEE. Improvements in rotorcraft modeling should be 
physics-based and research is needed here to inform the development of new standards.  
Understanding the simulation fidelity requirements for different levels of training devices will be an important aspect of future 
LOC-I training. It is anticipated that training could be conducted using a range to simulators to ensure that LOC-I training 
provision is available throughout the rotorcraft community. This could include the use of desktop simulators and developing 
technologies such as virtual reality. The challenge of using such technologies, and how regulations might need to be more 
flexible to allow the uptake of new technologies, is one of the themes of the Royal Aeronautical Society’s 2019 Spring Flight 
Simulation conference (Ref. 55) and should also be considered in any new LOC-I initiative. 
The role of motion cueing in LOC-I training needs should be carefully examined. Whilst valuable research has been undertaken 
to examine how motion tuning can change the task performance achieved by pilots in different scenarios and devices, a 
consolidated approach using common fidelity metrics and methods should be developed. Without this approach, it would be 
difficult to provide the supporting evidence needed in any new standards as to how vestibular cueing should be provided in 
simulators.  
In the Liverpool RSF project, the authors are developing a rational, physics-based approach for improving simulation models. 
Improvements in fidelity assessments and metrics e.g. for use in motion cueing, are also an important part of the RSF project. 
The outputs from this research can be used as part of any new LOC-I modeling and simulation initiative.  
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
LOC-I events are a significant element of rotorcraft accident statistics. Several initiatives have been launched to try address 
this problem. When faced with a similar problem in the fixed-wing community, a coordinated international activity was required 
to develop new training requirements to improve flight safety.  The authors of this paper would welcome input and contact 
from the rotorcraft community to plan a dedicated workshop on this topic at a future VFS/ERF/FAA/EASA/RAeS meeting to 
develop new rotorcraft safety focused research. Driven by the need to improve rotorcraft safety, the workshop could focus on 
the training needs, modeling and simulation challenges and regulatory issues that need to be tackled to advance the state of the 
art in this area.  
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
The current Rotorcraft Simulation Fidelity project is funded at UoL and collaborators at Liverpool John Moores University by 
the UK’s EPSRC through grants: EP/P031277/1 and EP/P030009/1. Thanks also to our project partners Advanced Rotorcraft 
Technology Inc., AMRDEC, and the Flight Research Laboratory at the NRC, Ottawa. 
Author contact: Mark D White mdw@liverpool.ac.uk, Neil Cameron ncameron@liverpool.ac.uk, Gareth D Padfield 
padfield@liverpool.ac.uk, Linghai Lu l.lu@ljmu.ac.uk,  Sunjoo Advani s.advani@idt-engineering.com  
REFERENCES  
1. Harris, F. D., “No Accidents – That’s the Objective”, The 26th Alexander A. Nikolsky Honorary Lecture, Journal of the American 
Helicopter Society, Vol. 52, (3), January 2007, pp. 3–14. 
2. Harris, F. D., Kasper, E. F., and Iseler, L. E., “U.S. Civil Rotorcraft Accidents, 1963 through 1997,” NASA TM-2000-209597. 
3. Padfield, G. D., “Rotorcraft Handling Qualities Engineering: Managing the Tension between Safety and Performance”, The 32nd 
Alexander A. Nikolsky Honorary Lecture, Journal of the American Helicopter Society, Vol. 58, (1), January 2013, pp. 1–27.  
4. http://www.ihst.org/portals/54/Key_Charts/2015%20USHST%20Metrics%203%20slides.pdf.  
5. U.S. Joint Helicopter Safety Analysis Team, “The Compendium Report: The U.S. JHSAT Baseline of Helicopter Accident Analysis: 
Volume I”, August 2011.  
 
20 
6. Lambregts, A. A., Nesemeier, G., Wilborn, J.E., and Newman, R. L., “Airplane Upsets: Old Problem, New Issues”, Paper AIAA 2008-
6867, AIAA Modeling and Simulation Technologies Conference and Exhibit, Honolulu, Hawaii, 18–21 August 2008. 
7. “Statistical Summary of Commercial Jet Airplane Accidents: Worldwide Operations 2008–2017”, Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, 
October 2018. 
8. NTSB Report Number: AAR-10-01, February 2, 2010. 
9. Royal Aeronautical Society Conference, “Flight Simulation: Towards the Edge of the Envelope”, London, UK June 3–4, 2009. 
10. www.icatee.org 
11. Advani, S. K., and Schroeder, J. A., “Global Implementation of Upset Prevention & Recovery Training”, AIAA SciTech Forum, San 
Diego California, USA, 4–8 January 2016. 
12. Anon., “Manual on Aeroplane Upset Prevention and Recovery Training”, ICAO Doc. 10011. 
13. Anon. “European Plan for Aviation Safety 2019–2023”, EASA, 22nd November 2018. 
14. Anon. “Update of flight simulation training device requirements - Upset prevention and recovery training (CS-FSTD(A) - Issue 2)”, 
EASA 2017. 
15. NTSB. CEN10FA509 Report, 2010. 
16. U.S. Joint Helicopter Safety Analysis Team, “The Compendium Report: The U.S. JHSAT Baseline of Helicopter Accident Analysis: 
Volume II”, July 2011. 
17. U.S. Helicopter Safety Team (USHST) “Report Helicopter Safety Enhancements: Loss of Control – Inflight, Unintended Flight in IMC, 
and Low-Altitude Operations”, October 3, 2017. 
18. NTSB Safety Alert, SA-031, “Safety Through Helicopter Simulators - Use of simulators can prepare helicopter pilots for emergencies 
and prevent accidents”, revised December 2015. 
19. Anon., “Analysis of 2006-2010 European Helicopter Accidents”, Final EHSAT Analysis Report, 2015. 
20. Anon., “Training and Testing of Emergency and Abnormal Procedures in Helicopters”, European Helicopter Safety Team, Training 
Leaflet HE11, November 2015.  
21. Private communication.  
22. Anon., “Agency Research Agenda 2019–2021”, EASA REV version 30/10/2018. 
23. Anon., “Certification Specifications for Helicopter Flight Simulation Training Devices, CS-FSTD(H)”, EASA, Initial Issue, 26 June 
2012. 
24. Anon., “Advantages of Simulators (FSTDs) in Helicopter Flight Training”, European Helicopter Safety Team, Training Leaflet HE6, 
July 2013.  
25. Anon., “JAR-STD 1H, Helicopter flight simulators”, April 2001, Joint Aviation Authorities. 
26. Padfield, G. D., Pavel, M., Casolaro, D., Roth, G., Hamers, M., and Taghizad, A., “Validation Criteria for Helicopter Real-Time 
Simulation Models; Sketches from the Work of GARTEUR HC-AG12”, 30th European Rotorcraft Forum, Marseilles, France, 14–16 
September 2004. 
27. Padfield, G. D., Pavel, M., Casolaro, D., Roth, G., Hamers, M., and Taghizad, A., “Fidelity of Helicopter Real-Time Models”, 61st 
Annual Forum of the American Helicopter Society, Grapevine, Texas, 1–3 June, 2005. 
28. Pavel, M. D., White, M. D., Padfield, G. D., Roth, G., Hamers, M., and Taghizad, A., “Validation of mathematical models for helicopter 
flight simulators current and future challenges”, The Aeronautical Journal, Vol. 117, (1190), April 2013, pp. 343–388.  
29. Anon, “AC-29A, Certification of Transport Category Rotorcraft”, Federal Aviation Administration Advisory Circular, 1987. 
30. Perfect, P., Timson, E., White, M. D., Padfield, G. D., Erdos, R., and Gubbels, A. W., “A Rating Scale for the Subjective Assessment of 
Simulation Fidelity”, The Aeronautical Journal, Vol. 118, (1206), August 2014, pp. 953–974.  
31. Perfect, P., White, M. D., Padfield, G. D., and Gubbels, A. W., “Rotorcraft Simulation Fidelity: New Methods for Quantification and 
Assessment”, The Aeronautical Journal, Vol. 117, (1189), March 2013, pp. 235–282.  
32. Anon. “Handling qualities requirements for military rotorcraft”, ADS-33E-PRF, US Army, March 2000. 
33. Timson, E., Perfect, P., White, M. D., Padfield, G. D., and Erdos, R., “Pilot Sensitivity to Flight Model Dynamics in Flight Simulation”, 
Paper 172, 37th European Rotorcraft Forum, Gallarate, Italy, 13–5 September 2011. 
34. Tischler, M. B., and Remple, R. K., Aircraft and Rotorcraft System Identification: Engineering Methods with Flight Test Examples, 
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Reston, VA, 2nd edition, 2012. 
35. Spira, D., Myrand-Lapierre, V., and Soucy, O., “Reducing Blade Element Model Configuration Data Requirements Using System 
Identification and Optimization”, 68th Annual Forum of the American Helicopter Society, Fort Worth, Texas, May 1–3, 2012. 
36. Lu, L., Padfield, G. D., White, M. D., and Perfect, P., “Fidelity Enhancement of a Rotorcraft Simulation Model through System 
Identification”, The Aeronautical Journal, Vol. 115, (1170), August 2011, pp. 453–470. 
37. https://www.researchgate.net/project/A-Novel-Approach-to-Rotorcraft-Simulation-Fidelity-Enhancement-and-Assessment  
38. Cameron, N., White, M. D., Padfield, G. D., Lu, L., Agarwal, D., and Gubbels, A. W., “Rotorcraft Modeling Renovation for Improved 
Fidelity”, presented at the Vertical Flight Society 75th Annual Forum, Philadelphia, USA, 13-16 May 2019. 
39. Padfield, G. D., Thorne, R., Murray, D. J., Black, C., and Caldwell, A. E., “UK research into system identification for helicopter flight 
mechanics”, Vertica, Vol. 11, (4), January 1987, pp. 665–684.  
40. Flight Magazine, December 10th, 1910, pp. 1006. 
41. Burki-Cohen, J., Soja, N., and Longridge, T., “Simulator Platform Motion—The Need Revisited”, The International Journal of Aviation 
Psychology, Vol. 8, (3), 1998, pp. 293–317. 
42. Longridge, T., Burki-Cohen, J., Go, T. H., and Kendra, A. J., “Simulator fidelity considerations for training and evaluation of today's 
airline pilots”, Proceedings of the 11th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, Columbus OH, USA, 5–8 March, 2001. 
43. McCauley, M. E., “Do Army Helicopter Training Simulators Need Motion Bases?” United States Army Research Institute for the 
Behavioral and Social Sciences, Technical Report 1176, February 2006. 
44. Sinacori, J. B., “The determination of some requirements for a helicopter flight research simulation facility”, NASA-CR-152066, 1977. 
45. Hodge, S., Manso, S., and White, M. D., “Challenges in Roll-Sway Motion Cueing Fidelity: A view from academia”, Royal Aeronautical 
Society Flight Simulation Group Spring Conference on ‘Challenges in Flight Simulation’, London, UK, 9-10 June 2015. 
46. Hodge, S. J., Perfect, P., Padfield, G. D., and White, M. D., “Optimising the Roll-Sway Motion Cues Available from a Short Stroke 
Hexapod Motion Platform”, The Aeronautical Journal, Vol. 119, (1211), January 2015, pp. 23–44. 
47. White, M. D., Perfect, P., Padfield, G. D., Gubbels, A. W., and Berryman, A. C., “Acceptance testing and commissioning of a flight 
simulator for rotorcraft simulation fidelity research” Proceedings of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers, Part G: Journal of 
Aerospace Engineering, Vol. 227, (4), April 2013, pp. 663–686.  
48. Hodge, S. J., Perfect, P., Padfield, G. D., and White, M. D., “Optimising the Yaw Motion Cues Available from a Short Stroke Hexapod 
 
21 
Motion Platform”, The Aeronautical Journal, Vol. 119, (1211), January 2015, pp. 1–22. 
49. Manso, S., White, M. D., and Hodge, S., “An Investigation of Task Specific Motion Cues for Rotorcraft Simulators”, Paper AIAA-2016-
2138, AIAA Science and Technology Forum and Exposition (SciTech) San Diego, USA, 4–8 January 2016. 
50. Anon., “Manual of Criteria for the Qualification of Flight Simulation Training Devices - Volume II — Helicopters”, ICAO 9625, 2012. 
51. Advani, S., and Hosman, R., “Design and Evaluation of the Objective Motion Cueing Test and Criterion”, The Aeronautical Journal, 
Vol. 120, (1227), May 2016, pp. 873-891.  
52. Jones, M., White, M. D., Fell, T., and Barnett, M., “Analysis of Motion Parameter Variations for Rotorcraft Flight Simulators”, 73rd 
Annual Forum of the American Helicopter Society, Fort Worth, Texas, USA, May 9–11, 2017. 
53. Dalmeijer, W., MiletoviC, I., Stroosma, O., and Pavel, M. D., “Extending the Objective Motion Cueing Test to Measure Rotorcraft 
Simulator Motion Characteristics”, 73rd Annual Forum of the American Helicopter Society, Fort Worth, Texas, USA, May 9–11, 2017. 
54. Grant, P., “Benchmarking Simulators: Results from a Replicated Helicopter Yaw Motion Study”, Royal Aeronautical Society Flight 
Simulation Group Spring Conference on ‘Striving for Effectiveness in Flight Simulation’, London, UK, 13–14 June 2017. 
55. Royal Aeronautical Society Flight Simulation Group Spring Conference on ‘The Future Reality of Flight Simulation’, London, UK, 11–
12 June 2019.  
 
 
 
22 
APPENDIX 1 – SIMULATOR FIDELITY RATING SCALE (REF. 30) 
  
 
